by LTC Gregory J. Lynch
MAJ Gregory J. Borden
SSG Robert J. Stewart
Operations other than war. Low-intensity conflict. Peace making. Peace enforcement. By whatever name, these missions are performed more frequently by a post-Cold War U.S. Army. As vital as that mission is, the Army’s primary mission remains: to fight and win our nation’s wars. It is a leader’s responsibility to ensure his unit can accomplish a warfighting mission, even as it performs a peacekeeping mission. The challenge becomes being able to overcome and adapt to the inherent restrictions placed on units performing peacekeeping assignments. Task Force 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) deployed to the Sinai Peninsula from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii in July 1996, as the thirty-first USBATT rotation in support of the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission. The six month mission is to observe and report compliance of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace signed in 1979. By the terms of the treaty, the Task Force maintains a visible and unprovocative posture to maintain the peace. During the deployment, Task Force 2-27 IN was faced with an ever-present dilemma encountered by more and more combat units: maintaining warfighting ability while conducting an on-going peacekeeping mission. When the United States began sending infantry battalions to the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, there were over 750,000 soldiers and eighteen divisions in the Active Army. The Army’s warfighting mission was not seriously affected by having a battalion dedicated to a peacekeeping mission. With a current force of 500,000 and a ten division Army, a single battalion cannot afford to lose its fighting edge. Valuable training time on warfighting skills can be lost for a year with MFO pre-deployment training at home station, MFO sustainment training while deployed, and reorganization after re-deployment. The limited training time and resources available in the Sinai create leadership challenges that are only overcome by units with dedicated and creative leaders that find innovative means to maintain the "Fighting Edge." Before deploying, the Task Force quantified a complete mission success as "completing the six month tour with mission accomplishment and no serious safety incidents while keeping soldiers trained." Keeping soldiers trained translated into focusing on fundamentals at the individual and small unit levels. To maintain the unit’s training level, leaders focused on what the mission gave them: squads and platoons temporarily relieved of their remote site peacekeeping duties, quality time to train to standard and the availability of training space. The U.S. Task Force, one of three infantry battalions in the MFO, is based at South Camp located outside of Sharm El Shiehk in southern Sinai. It is the support base for the U.S. sector providing logistical and administrative support to the USBATT mission. Twelve observation posts were manned by infantry squads along the eastern coast of the Sinai Peninsula. The squads rotated back to South Camp every twenty-three days after relief by another Task Force squad. During rotations, one hundred and fifty soldiers manned remote sites. Those remaining on South Camp had divided tasks and duties. The twenty-three day rotation model provided two days of recovery from rotation, six days of South Camp security and support taskings, six days cultural orientation, seven days training, and two days preparation for rotation back to the remote sites. Because of limited training time, the Wolfhounds made the most of the seven days they had every month and a half. Eliminating distracters and capitalizing on scarce assets was challenging, while maintaining standards and mastering fundamentals remained the keys to success. "To maintain those warfighting skills... we don’t want to get fancy, we just want to do basic battle drills," explained Lieutenant Colonel Gregory J. Lynch, Commander of Task Force 2-27 Infantry. "React to contact and squad attack, that’s basic, fundamental stuff for infantry squads. If we stick to battle drills and train to standard, we will maintain those warfighting skills." Objective training standards were established and met for the six month rotation. Each fire team, squad, and platoon conducted a day and night maneuver live fire. In these scenarios, the maneuver element’s higher headquarters provided command and control. At the platoon level, observer controllers from the Task Force staff provided external evaluation. An external evaluation combined with a live-fire was conducted by the battalion’s mortar platoon. And, finally, individual skills were honed by train-up and testing for the Expert Infantryman Badge and Expert Field Medic Badge. Training limitations were a chief concern when planning training events. The treaty limits the number and types of weapon systems an infantry battalion may deploy. Although challenged, Task Force 2-27 deployed with all assigned small arms and necessary equipment to properly train company line platoons as well as battalion specialty platoons. Maneuver training was restricted to squad and platoon-size elements. Innovative measures allowed company commanders to exercise command and control over maneuvering elements. Mortar ammunition was limited to the short range training round and illumination rounds. Live-fires were still conducted using what ammunition was available. TOW live-fire gunnery was completely eliminated, but by using training simulators gunner skills were not lost. Treaty restrictions were followed, and overcome. Weight restrictions on aircraft loads severely restricted the amount of training aids brought by the battalion. Only 6500 pounds of training materials were brought from Hawaii, with the emphasis on EIB training aids, manuals and target lifters to make an improvised range. This, in itself, was a challenge because of an combined weight ceiling of 210,000 pounds for the 529 soldier Task Force, their personal equipment and the training resources. Task Force 2-27 had the luxury of performing as its own Range Control. South Camp is equipped with a 25-meter range capable of supporting the zeroing and qualification of all small arm weapons. Peacekeeper Range, located 10 miles north of South Camp, is the prime training area for the USBATT. With a number of live-fire objective areas, static ranges for all small arms, and mortar round impact areas, it can be easily adapted to various scenarios. "We have our own ranges, we can control our environment," said Major James Shutt, S-3/Training and Operations Officer for Task Force 2-27 Infantry. "We have more flexibility here." The outcome? Task Force 2-27 conducted over 150 live-fire iterations both day and night with squad and platoon-size elements. This allowed the newer soldiers to learn and master basic fundamental battle drills. Task Force Command Sergeant Major Rodney Chang noted that because the battalion was augmented shortly before deployment with privates just out of OSUT, they hadn’t had the chance to train for battle with the unit. "Keeping squads and platoons combat-ready is important for success when the battalion resumes it’s warfighting mission in January." Laying a strong foundation of individual, squad and platoon skills allows the battalion to more quickly expand its training scope once it is redeployed and able to train on a more complex collective level. Company commanders exercised command and control as a squad or a platoon maneuvered onto the objective. The Task Force issued a battalion operations order to company commanders during platoon live fire exercises. Observer/controllers provided by the Task Force staff evaluated the orders process at the platoon leader level. The company commander also received practice at developing his own operations order and delivering the order to platoon leaders as part of the platoon external evaluation. Additional company level command and control tasks were exercised by involving a second platoon leader during platoon evaluations. The additional platoon leader participated with his platoon’s two machine gun teams in a maneuver platoon live fire exercise. This allowed the company commander to maneuver one complete platoon plus the additional platoon leader and machine guns. In one night iteration, the battalion mortar platoon was employed to provide indirect fire support using illumination rounds. This expanded the company commander’s command and control role and exercised additional battlefield operating systems while still adhering to the Treaty of Peace constraints. Innovation was paramount to providing quality training. Support from the 1st US Support Battalion aviation detachment, stationed at South Camp, provided opportunities to train personnel in air assault skills. The Treaty precludes helicopters flying in formation, but the Task Force was able to move platoons and a company command element, one UH-1H at a time, from South Camp to the Peacekeeper range complex. The company commander and platoon leaders planned all the necessary details required for a company air assault mission. This included participation in air mission briefs and the set-up and security of landing zones and pick-up zones. Flexibility was key for mortar training. The battalion’s compliment of indirect-fire infantryman were gathered from the company 60mm sections and the battalion 81mm platoon to form a consolidated mortar platoon in order to meet the manning requirements of two remote sites. The mortar platoon deployed with two 81mm mortars, two 60mm mortars and eight Mortar Ballistic Computers. The mortar equipment was divided between the two remote sites so the squads could train on gunner and Fire Direction Center skills while manning the remote site. So as mortar training was limited in the down-range effect, the quality of gunnery and Fire Direction Center training did not diminish. Mortar ammunition allotments differed from home station training resources. The Treaty of Peace prohibits dud producing rounds such as high explosive and white phosphorous, but effective use of short range training rounds and illumination rounds provided a training benefit to the mortar platoon as well as being incorporated into platoon live fire scenarios. The mortar platoon evaluation concentrated primarily on the mortar platoon leader’s ability to plan and execute platoon-level command and control and the fire direction center’s ability to provide fire support to the battalion. Captain Steve Workman, Battalion Fire Support Officer stated, "I see this as more of a training event with external supervision. The training value lying in the FDC and platoon leader learning to support and sustain the battalion in a maneuver environment." Again, basics and fundamentals were stressed throughout the exercise. The platoon’s ability to maneuver, provide indirect fire, defend and sustain itself on the battlefield were all extensively evaluated. Anti-tank missiles are prohibited by the Treaty of Peace. Previous Task Forces elected not to deploy their anti-tank platoons or compromised gunners’ skills by focusing on peacekeeping skills instead of maintaining gunner skills. The Wolfhounds requested and received permission to deploy a TOW Gunnery Trainer (TGT) with them. A fully enclosed simulator, the TGT allowed the anti-tank gunners to maintain their skill at tracking and firing on armored vehicles. In considering that qualification on the TGT is mandatory prior to any live TOW round being fired and a quarterly training requirement, bringing the TGT allowed the anti-tank platoon ample opportunity to train on gunner skills. "Gunners have to qualify on Tables One through Four. One and two being practice and three and four being qualification. Bringing the TGT allowed us to maintain perishable skills," said Staff Sergeant Michael Bordelon, the anti-tank platoon platoon sergeant. The battalion scout platoon exercised its reconnaissance techniques on several training exercises. During the first exercise, an opposing force positioned themselves in an encampment and conducted routine operations throughout the day and night that allowed the scouts to observe and report their activities. The mission began with a waterborne insertion onto a beach followed by a simulated link-up with local patriots and a vehicle movement to the training area. Once off-loaded, the scouts located and observed the opposing forces actions and relayed situation reports to the battalion S-2. "Overall it was very productive training," Sergeant Christopher Murphy, scout platoon squad leader, said. "I had two new men in my team and it gave them a chance to realize what Scouts mission is." Task Force 2-27 capitalized on the time allowed for individual skill development while manning remote sites. Squad leaders served as site commanders on all remote sites. This allowed the squad leader flexibility to tailor his squad’s training to reflect squad strengths and weaknesses. This greatly increased the number of Expert Infantryman Badge recipients. Of the 250 eligible candidates, 83 soldiers earned their EIB. The Task Force medics showed equal success. 20 candidates began the testing for the Expert Field Medic Badge, 8 medics earned the coveted EFMB. As an increasing number of Army units are committed to non-warfighting missions, their leadership must follow the example set by Task Force 2-27 IN. The leadership of Task Force 2-27 Infantry (Wolfhounds) clearly identified key training objectives prior to deployment and identified the training limitations and resources associated with being 12,000 miles away from home station. Through innovation and creative planning, the Task Force accomplished its peacekeeping mission and executed a training plan that allowed it to sustain and improve the edge needed to fight and win our nation’s wars. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory J. Lynch served as Task Force 2-27 Commander. He will attend the Army War College this summer. Major Gregory J. Borden served as Task Force 2-27 Executive Officer. He previously served in the MFO as a Company Commander with Task Force 2-325 IN. Staff Sergeant Robert J. Stewart served as the Task Force 2-27 Protocol NCOIC. He will attend Infantry Mortar Leaders Course at Ft. Benning this spring before reporting to Ft. Lewis, WA. Jan 97 Also See 2-27 Multinational Force Mission This article also appeared in the May 1997 issue of Army The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) can be found at http://www.ausa.org Photo Credit: Specialist George A. Chidi, Jr. 25th Infantry Division (Light) Public Affairs Office. | 