B a t t l e  R e p o r t

LUZON CAMPAIGN
 

Twenty-Seventh United States Infantry

Prepared by Direction of
Colonel Philip F. Lindeman
Commanding Officer

Compiled by
Captain Ralph B Reeves Jr.

Chapter One

PRIOR PLANNING AND PREPARATION

In November the Regimental Commander was informed that the 27th Infantry would be engaged in the Luzon operation of the Philippine Liberation Campaign, code name of the operation: Mike I of Musketeer III. The division was schedu1ed to land over the beaches adjacent to Lingayen Gulf with the mission of Sixth Army Reserve. Originally the Target Date was scheduled for 20 December 1944; however, this was changed to 9 January 1945. The 25th Division was assigned a landing date two days after the Target Date, or 11 January.

Upon receiving information concerning the proposed Luzon operation the Regimental Commander directed the estab1ishment of a "War Room" in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post and was continuously guarded to prevent the entrance of unauthorized personnel. A group composed of four staff officers and a clerk-typist began preparations according to the plan of the Regimental Commander.

After a study of the information supplied by Southwest Pacific Area in the form of terrain studies and Intelligence reports and a study of the field orders of I Corps, XIV Corps, and 25th Infantry Division, the publication of the Regimental Field Order was commenced. (See FO 1, Hq 27th Inf, annex C.)

Inasmuch as the division constituted a floating reserve prepared to land in the sector of either or both corps no definite plans could be formed in any detail. Provisions were made for landing on either a friendly or hostile beach in any sector.

A series of subjects were scheduled to further training related to reports of Sixth Army operations then currently in progress on Leyte Island. Among those subjects were Tank-Infantry operations, Street and Village Fighting, Mines and Booby Traps, Reduction of Pillboxes, Combat Patrolling, Map and Compass work, and Japanese Small Unit Tactics. Further emphasis was placed on physical conditioning which included Road Marches, Hill Climbing, and training on the Bayonet Assault Courses.

Late in November the battalion commanders were issued the Regimental Field Order and were authorized access to the War Room for study of available information.

Supply shortages were replaced, all units crated their equipment, and supply movement was commenced to Noumea. Equipment was segregated into three groups: Assault Echelon, Forward Echelon, and Rear Echelon.

Quantities of maps began to arrive from higher headquarters, and these were sorted for later distribution near the target area. As the maps at this time were classified as "Top Secret" (as was all other matter pertaining to the Luzon Operation) the supplies of maps for subordinate units were bundled and crated. Provisions were made for them to be kept under guard until after the last stop en route to the Target Area.

Chapter Two

MOVEMENT

On 15 December the regiment moved by truck to the Noumea Dock area. The Regimental Combat Team was divided into battalion landing teams and loaded onto the ships of Transport Division "Baker" of Task Unit 77.9.1of Task Group 77.9:

The First Battalion Landing Team

Aboard The

USS OXFORD

The Second Battalion Landing Team

Aboard The

USS LATIMER

The Third Battalion Landing Team

Aboard The

USS COMET

Materiel From All Battalions

Aboard The

USS NAVAJO VICTORY

On 16 December the first three waves from each transport made a practice run in Noumea Harbor, and on 17 December Task Unit 77.9.1 (Noumea Transport Group) was underway at 1100. Composition of the Task Unit was:

Transport Division "Able" Transport Division "Baker"

APA PRESIDENT JACKSON * APA LATIMER *

APA PRESIDENT ADAMS APA OXFORD

AP PRESIDENT MONROE AP COMET

APA ALGOL XAK NAVAJO VICTORY

Transport Division "Charlie" Transport Group Screen

APA ZEILIN * DD MC NAIR

APA OCONTO DD NORMAN SCOTT

APA LAURENS DD MELVIN

APA AUDRAIN

* Flag Ship

The 25th Infantry Division had made arrangements for the use of the beach and coastal plain area east of Tetere, Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands.

In order to provide for equalized training of all units the problem was arranged for a landing of three regiments abreast. The exercise consisted of a theoretical opposed landing over a hostile beach followed by the establishment of a division beachhead.

On 21December 1944 the practice maneuver was executed, and the regiment went into bivouac in the coconut grove near Tetere, reembarking on the transports 23 December.

At Manus, Admiralty Islands, a stop was made for refuelling (sic), and on 1 January the regiment went ashore for a recreational party on Petilu Island, north of the Manus anchorage.

On 2 January the convoy weighed anchor, and Task Unit 77.9.1 reverted to Task Group 77.9. Additional shipping including two escort carriers joined the group, and at 0600 the task group was underway.

Aboard ships "briefing" of troops was commenced. Every effort was made to familiarize all personnel with all details of the forthcoming operation, its mechanics, its purpose, and the part each individual was to play in the liberation of the Philippine Islands and the Filipino people.

L-O-G

Noumea, New Caledonia, Loyalty Islands

To

Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands

17 Dec Underway at 1100 as Transport Division "Baker," Task

1944 : Unit Seven Seven Point Nine Point One.

23. Dec Landed east of Tetere, Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands

1944: for practice maneuver

23 Dec Re-embarked on transports.

1944:

25 Dec At anchor, Purvis Bay, Florida, British Solomon Islands

1944:

28 Dec Sighted islands of New Britain and New Guinea.

1944:

29 Dec Anchored in channel north of Manus, Admiralty Is-

1944: lands. Refuelled (sic).

01 Jan Recreation party on Petilu Island, Admiralty Islands.

1945:

02 Jan Underway at 0600. 2 escort carriers (CVE's) joined convoy.

1945:

03 Jan Briefing of troops concerning Luzon Operation.

1945: Continued until entry into Lingayen Gulf.

05 Jan Additional ships joined convoy bringing total to

1945: approximately 50 ships including 2 CVE's and 16 DD's and APD's.

07 Jan Sighted Leyte Island. During night entered Surigao Strait.

1945:

08 Jan Sailed around Leyte into Sulu Sea.

1945:

09 Jan "S Day" for landing of Luzon Attack Force, Lingayen Gulf.

1945:

10 Jan In South China Sea. Passed ships from Luzon Attack Force

1945: moving south to Leyte. Tractor Group of over 50 cargo ships, LST's, etc, appeared on western horizon.

11 Jan Landed over White Beach 2, Lingayen Gulf, Luzon,

1945: approximately one mile northwest of San Fabian, Pangasinan Province.

Chapter Three

LANDING AND INITIAL ASSEMBLY

At dawn 11 January the convoy entered Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. Instructions were received to land in the I Corps sector over White Beach, approximately one mile northwest of the coastal poblacion of San Fabian.

The 3d Battalion, having trained as shore party personnel, unloaded supplies from the small craft, established supply dumps on the beach, and commenced movement of supplies inland to the Regimental Assembly Area which was located south of San Jacinto, Pangasinan Province. This assembly area was outposted by the 2d Battalion, and the remainder of the regiment moved by foot to establish a bivouac.

Patrolling was immediately initiated toward Mapandan and Manaoag, and improvements were commenced on the roads leading to the east and south in anticipation of a future movement either to the south or southeast.

The Personnel Section was located in an area near Service Company, and in this area each company established a storage dump to store kitchens, barracks bags, and other Forward Echelon equipment that units did not plan to carry with them once the regiment was committed to action.

Completion of unloading operations required a considerable time because of a shortage of lighterage and other small craft needed for the ship-to-shore movement of supplies. Until this unloading was completed the 3d Battalion remained at White Beach.

Chapter Four

SAN JACINTO TO SANTA MARIA

During the morning of 16 January a warning order was received from the Division Commander to be prepared to move on call in the probable sector Pozorrubio - Binaloanan, thence to San Jose. A movement order was received at 0200, 17 January, directing that the Combat Team, less the 3d Battalion in Division Reserve move to the east toward the Binaloanan - Urdaneta Road and there seize this north - south road exclusive of Binalonan and Urdaneta.

At 0700, 17 January, the Advance Guard which consisted of the 2d. Battalion cleared the Regimental Bivouac and proceeded to the east. The 1st Battalion followed, turning north at Santa Ines, and at 1430 the 1st and 2d Battalions were emplaced on the "New Cutoff" of Highway 3. The Regimental command post was established near the barrio of Santa Ines, and the 3d Battalion moved into Manaoag.

Plans were made to assist the 1st Infantry attack on Urdaneta; however, this operation was cancelled, and upon seizure of the poblacion, the 2d Battalion relieved 1st Infantry units as local security. Patrolling was initiated toward Asingan, and when it was discovered that the enemy no longer occupied this area a platoon of the 1st Battalion was dispatched to garrison the poblacion. The Regimental Command post displaced forward to Urdaneta.

The first enemy contact occurred on 18 January when a road block of Company A which was located south of Binaloanan destroyed an enemy medium tank and killed five crew members in addition to two enemy riding on the outside.

Orders were received to advance 6000 yards east of Urdaneta, and on 19 January the 1st Battalion on the north and the 2d Battalion on the south completed this advance. Reconnaissance was made to the Agno River to locate a suitable site for a ford near Santa Maria.

Small scattered groups of enemy were contacted in various parts of the Regimental sector; however, they offered no threat to any installations. The 1st Battalion moved to Asingan and Company A was dispatched to Santa Maria, however, because of a fierce battle of the 16lst Infantry in San Manuel to the north, the battalion was withdrawn in order that a comparatively even sector could be maintained by the division. The movement to Asingan had caused a wide northwest-southeast gap between the two regiments.

On 26 January the 3d Battalion was designated as I Corps Reserve and moved into an assembly area near Pozorrubio.

From the time the initial assembly area was left until a further advance to the east was ordered, patrol action accounted for 54 enemy killed and two prisoners of war captured.

Chapter Five

P E M I E N T A

Orders were received from the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, to continue the advance to the east from positions occupied in the vicinity of the Agno River. The 1st Battalion proceeded cross-country to Baligayan, and from there dispatched Company C to Salvador for the purpose of securing the Manila Railroad at that point.

From Baligayan the 1st Battalion was ordered to join Company C, advance on Pemienta, and in the vicinity thereof establish a road block to deny enemy use in all directions.

The 2d Battalion, after closing on Baligayan, was ordered to be prepared to reinforce the 1st Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, released from I Corps Reserve, was ordered to assemble at Baligayan.

The 1st Battalion, in approach march formation of Company A, Battalion Command Post, Company B, Battalion Headquarters Company, and that portion of Company D not attached to Company C closed on Salvador.

With 75 Guerrillas of Squadron 269, the 1st Battalion moved thru Cabalitian, Flores, Buenavista, Esperanza, and thence south to the road junction 600 yards west of the barrio of Pemienta. This move was made without contact, the battalion arriving at 1345, 29 January 1945. At 1300 a patrol of Company C, moving in advance of the battalion, detected on undetermined number of enemy in Pemienta.

From the road junction Company C moved east and at 1410, the forward elements received small arms and "knee" mortar fire. Company A was ordered by the Battalion Commander to envelop the left flank, and the company moved across a rice field 300 yards off the highway to a wooded area, the only available terrain that could locally conceal an attack. Company B remained in Battalion Reserve and secured the right and rear of Company C. The attack was carried on until 1750 at which time three-quarters of the barrio had been taken.

During the attack the enemy had employed flat-trajectory field pieces or dug-in tanks to fire point blank at the leading elements of Companies A and C. At 1800 the volume of fire from those weapons increased, and some mortar fire was encountered.

Company C formed a strong-point on the south side of the road, extending well into Pemienta and following a wood-line. Company A organized the north of the road, also extending about three-quarters of the way into the barrio. A platoon from Company B connected the two companies at the western end of the barrio. Two 37mm antitank guns were emplaced covering the road to the east, and the third antitank gun faced west in the Company B Platoon sector.

Simultaneous with the forming of this block, another was formed 800 yards west of Pemienta. This western block was formed by the 1st platoon of Company B, two 37mm antitank guns, and a section of 81mm mortars from Company D.

Around 1915 the Pemienta group began to receive intense fire from the direction of Umingan. The character of this fire seemed to be 90mm mortar and field pieces of approximately 75mm size. For five minutes thirty rounds per minute fell on the area occupied by our troops causing 15 casualties, mostly from tree-bursts. After this concentration the fire became more intermittent for the next three hours.

At 2000 two tanks were observed on the highway, approaching from the west. 37mm and 81mm fire was brought on the tanks, and within 250 yards of the block, both were destroyed.

An increased volume of fire came from the west. Darkness prevented observation of its origin; however, it appeared to be 37mm, 47mm, and perhaps larger caliber, as well as rifle and automatic weapon fire. During the ensuing three-and-a-half hours intense mortar and artillery fire was placed on the enemy.

Because of an exhaustion of ammunition the western road block was given permission to withdraw to the Battalion Command post which had moved to the river crossing 750 yards northwest of the road junction. The enemy ceased his heavy fire upon withdrawal of the group, and sounds of engines being started could be heard to the west as if the enemy were re-forming.

As the previous tank-infantry attack had developed from that direction, the Company A Commander shifted the M7 and 37mm guns to the western portion of his position. At about 2345 an enemy motorized column passed thru the vacated road block and approached the still-occupied positions at the western end of Pemienta.

All fires, 37mm antitank, 105mm from the M7, Bazooka from Company A, heavy machine gun, and rifle, were directed against the enemy column. Several vehicles were set on fire, and the entire column was halted.

The enemy then placed three 10cm howitzers in the rice field, echeloned 100 yards on the left side of the road, bringing point-blank fire on our positions. Groups of enemy made "Banzai" charges until almost 0430, 30 January, at which time the remaining enemy withdrew, apparently taking their wounded with them.

Flanking fire from the M7 in the vicinity of the Battalion Command Post, 60mm and 81mm mortar fire, and artillery fire were brought upon the enemy until the end of the engagement at 0430.

At dawn the following destroyed materiel was counted:

8 Medium tanks

8 Tracked artillery prime-movers

2 4-Bogie armored tractors with trailers

8 10 centimeter howitzers

1 37 millimeter howitzer

5 6-wheel trucks

5 Large 4 wheel trailers

2 Commercial automobiles

1 Nash staff car

1 US Army Jeep

Enemy casualties:

123 Killed

3 Prisoners of War

Chapter Six

UMINGAN

Following the road block action at Pemienta the Commanding General, 25^th Infantry Division, assigned to the 27th Infantry the mission:

"Block San Quintin - Umingan Road with one reinforced company. Attack Umingan from the northwest following an air strike and artillery preparation."

Charged with the defense of Umingan was a Japanese force totaling approximately five hundred. This group was composed of elements of the 2d Company, 63d Infantry; the 3d Battalion and Heavy Machine Gun Antitank Company of the 26th Independent Mixed Regiment; and the 1st Battalion, 2d Mobile Infantry of the 2d Armored Division.

The enemy had prepared fortified positions to defend the area against an attack from any or all directions. Included in the enemy scheme of defense were gun positions providing for a shifting of supporting weapons to any sector for a concentration of fire power.

The Regimental Commander directed that all battalions send combat and reconnaissance patrols into the area surrounding the poblacion of Umingan. The purpose of this patrolling was to destroy enemy in the immediate proximity of our forces, reconnoiter for a suitable road block site, and determine the location and strength of enemy forces defending Umingan. (See Opns Memo F2, Hq 27th Inf, Annex C.)

Patrolling was initiated by all battalions and the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, and it was determined that the enemy continued to hold Umingan in force. Indications were that the central portion of the town was lightly held and that the strongest fortifications were located near the outer edges.

Plans were made for an assault on Umingan, and at midnight, 31 January, orders were issued to the subordinate commanders. The regimental plan visualized a two-battalion attack, the 1st Battalion from the west and the 3d Battalion from the north. This plan was formed in connection with 35th Infantry blocks on the roads leading from Umingan.

To prevent enemy reinforcement from San Quintin the 2d Battalion was directed to cut the Umingan - San Quintin Road with one reinforced company. The remainder of the battalion reverted to Regimental Reserve, prepared to support the attack of either of the assault battalions. (See F0 6, Hq 27th Inf, Annex C.)

At 1030, 1 February, B-25's made a low-level attack on Umingan, but unfortunately the greater part of the bombs fell in the central sector and not on the outer fringes where the main positions were emplaced. Following the air strike and under cover of a Division Artillery preparation the 1st and 3d Battalions commenced their advance across the open fields adjacent to Umingan.

The 1st Battalion advanced with two companies abreast, Company B on the north and Company C on the south. Company A remained initially in reserve. The advance moved to within 250 yards of the western limits of the poblacion without opposition, but upon lifting of the artillery fire both companies were immediately pinned to the ground by intense rifle and machine gun fire. Troops were in an open rice field with no cover other than shallow irrigation ditches from six inches to two feet in depth.

The Regimental Commander, Colonel David H Buchanan, was wounded by sniper fire; and the Executive Officer, Lt-Colonel Conway J Christianson, assumed temporary command of the regiment.

Self-propelled cannon, machine gun, and mortar fire were deployed, but neither company was able to advance. Casualties were heavy, and evacuation across the open rice fields was extremely difficult. The ditches in juxtaposition of the highway were used for evacuation once the litter bearers had crossed the rice fields.

An attempt was made to employ the attached medium tanks; however, the boggy condition of the rice paddies restricted tank movement to the road, and this was covered by five antitank guns.

Company A (less one platoon remaining in Battalion Reserve) was ordered to envelop from the north, and after overcoming heavy resistance, one platoon reached the western edge of the town. This platoon made contact with the north flank of Company B, and Companies B and C attempted to advance. This advance, however, was measured in yards; and Company A, meeting an extension of the resistance confronting Companies B and C, dispatched a platoon to reconnoiter for a route into Umingan via a creek bed. Once this platoon had found a suitable route the remainder of the company employed effective fire-and-movement and worked its way north around the enemy flank and into town.

Meanwhile the 3d Battalion was attacking from the north. Company I had moved out to secure a battalion assembly area at Barat and to block the road from Buenavista. The battalion closed in at Barat and awaited the air strike. After the strike Company L crossed the Line of Departure and advanced south toward the barrio of Nancalabasan. When approximately 150 yards from the barrio small arms and mortar fire were received, and as the fire became more intense the company was pinned down. A fire fight ensued with no decline in enemy resistance; however, his mortars were located near Abalos. Artillery fire was placed on these weapons, and at 1500 Company L resumed the attack.

Company K was committed on Company L's west flank, and medium tanks were placed in position on the east. Company I scoured the supply route from the forward companies to the battalion assembly area at Barat. At 1800 the push was halted, and the battalion dug in for the night.

During the night of 1-2 February Colonel (then Lt-Colonel) Philip F Lindeman of the 161st Infantry assumed command of the 27th Infantry.

Information was received that on 2 February the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, would attack Umingan from the south and that the 2d Battalion of the same regiment would attack from the southeast. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion was ordered to maintain pressure on the enemy to its front, contact the 3d Battalion of the 35th Infantry, and with them coordinate an advance. The 3d Battalion was directed to continue the attack to the south, and the 2d Battalion was notified to reconnoiter for a route of attack on Umingan from the northwest between the 1st and 3d Battalions.

On 2 February the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, entered the center of Umingan without opposition. Contact was made between Company A and the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry; however, the latter's advance had eliminated none of the resistance confronting the 1st Battalion.

The 27th Infantry relieved the 35th Infantry's 3d Battalion, and the Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to advance on Umingan from the northwest. By 1700 the battalion had entered the poblacion, and further orders directed security of the western, northern, and southern sectors of Umingan.

The 1st Battalion was directed to attack from the center to the southwest, and after Companies B and C bypassed the enemy to their east, the attack was launched at 1800.

In the meantime the 3d Battalion, after an artillery and mortar preparation, commenced an attack to the south, Company L to the east and Company K to the south toward the cemetery at the northern end of Umingan. The advance was slowed down by intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar tire from well-emplaced enemy, and at 1700 patrols contacted the 35th Infantry.

Nightfall was approaching, and as none of the roads into Umingan were open, supplies were loaded on self-propelled cannon which forced their way into the poblacion. Wounded were evacuated by one of the mounts, and one was employed to fire on enemy resistance in the western sector of the town. By dark the 1st Battalion reached the northern edge of the San Leon - Umingan Highway.

The morning of 3 February the 1st Battalion continued reduction of the enemy in the western sector, and the removal of demolitions from the bridge on the San Leon Highway opened this route for traffic. In the northern sector enemy pillboxes continued to impede the southern advance of the 3d Battalion. Rifle grenades and bazookas were ineffective against these emplacements, and medium tanks were emp1oyed to complete the reduction.

Remaining enemy stragglers were mopped up, and the town was organized for defense, the 1st Battalion in the western sector and the 3d Battalion in the northern.

In the battle for Umingan the enemy sustained a loss of 147 personnel and the following materiel:

5 47mm Antitank Guns

3 37mm Antitank Guns

8 Knee Mortars

2 1k-Ton Trucks

1 Chrysler Sedan (1941 model)

Considerable 47mm and

75mm ammunition.

Chapter Seven

LUMBOY - PUNCAN MOUNTAIN

From Umingan the regiment was ordered to proceed to the poblacion of San Jose, located at the southern end of the foothills of the Caraballo Mountains. The 1st Battalion remained in Umingan as Division Reserve, and the remainder of the 27th Infantry moved to San Jose.

At the time there were numerous small bands of enemy stragglers who were lost from their units en route to the Balete Pass - Santa Fe area from the general area in the vicinity of Cabanatuan. In addition were roving bands of suicide infiltration units in the rural area surrounding San Jose.

Initially the 2d and 3d Battalions were assigned defensive security sectors of San Jose; however, on 9 February the 2d Battalion was ordered to commence probing operations E of San Jose to the sharp turn to the N of Highway 5 along the Talavera River Valley.

Highway 5 was the only road or other feasible supply route for the retreating enemy and for any offensive operations to the N by our forces. The highway, after the sharp turn E of San Jose, follows the Talavera-Digdig River line along the slopes of the Caraballo Mountains and is the only north-south road connecting the Cagayan Valley with the Central Plains.

From a Main Line of Defense near Balete Pass, the enemy had constructed a series of outposts and strong points along the thirty mile stretch of road south to the Plains. This system of defenses included line troops from his main Infantry which had retreated to the north, an additional Infantry division, and filler replacements from various service units which had withdrawn from the Manila - Clark Field area.

Flanking Highway 5 sides are sheer slopes which gradually increase in altitude as the road winds farther north, and this advantage of terrain was comprehensively appreciated and exploited by the enemy.

Initial instructions from Division Headquarters directed only strong probing action designed to cause the enemy to expect the possibility of a general attack at any time in order to fix his strength near the southern end of the valley. Later a general attack to the north was ordered; however, the initial mission of the regiment consisted of a strong threat to the enemy without committing the entire strength of the unit.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to form the Finding Force of the 27th Infantry; and on 10 February the Battalion, with Company F in the lead, moved out to the east. The 3d Battalion, supported by the Cannon and Antitank Companies, was assigned the mission of providing for the security of San Jose. The 1st Bn, continuing in Division reserve, moved to the Agricultural School west of San Jose.

Company F reached Rosaldo, a small barrio five miles east of San Jose, and contact was made with an undetermined number of enemy. An attack supported by artillery enabled the company to seize the high ground overlooking the Talavera River from the west.

Company K was assigned the mission of clearing the enemy from the north of Highway 5 west of the sharp bend at the Talavera River. This was accomplished and Companies F and K were ordered to attack north and south respectively, and on the morning of 14 February the two companies met. Company E then relieved Company F and Company G relieved Company K.

The following day reconnaissance patrols from the 2d Battalion contacted numerous small enemy groups in the mountain ridge to the east of the highway. Combat-reconnaissance patrols from Company G, however, made no contacts to the immediate north.

On 15 February Company E was ordered to patrol in force as far north as Lumboy. With a right (east) flank screen made up of Battalion Intelligence personnel, the combat patrol moved north- -along the high ridges west of Highway 5 and contacted an enemy reinforced platoon south of Lumboy. The remainder of the company closed on its advanced patrols and initiated further patrolling down the steep wooded ravines leading east to Highway 5 at Lumboy. Company G was then ordered to seize Lumboy Bridge intact and block the highway.

The regiments probing patrol mission was changed to one of driving north along Highway 5, and the 1st Battalion was alerted to move from the Agricultural School to the sector east of the highway, and the 2d battalion was assigned the western sector. The 3d Battalion reverted to Division Reserve, and Antitank and Cannon Companies assumed the responsibility of the security of San Jose. This plan followed the conviction of the Regimental Commander that the soundest method of approach was to seize the high ground on each side of Highway 5 then move in force along the road bed.

On 21 February the 1st Battalion moved into an assembly area east of Highway 5, and

three objectives were assigned the two battalions. (See F0 8, Hq. 27th lnf, Annex C.)

Patrols from Companies A and B moved out on 23 February to attempt to occupy the first two objectives by a wide, sweeping movement to the east, and a sizable enemy force was contacted 300 yards short of the objective. The following day the Battalion Commander ordered Company A to attack, seize, and hold the first two objectives while Company C was to seize the third objective.

By 1400 Company A plus one platoon of Company B followed a close-in artillery preparation to seize the first objective. Most of the defenders were held in their emplacements by covering fires of machine guns and automatic rifles while the attacking force literally burned the enemy with white phosphorous grenades. As this hill was being secured the Company A Commander ordered one platoon to advance to the second objective some 1500 yards to the north.

No contact was made until the platoon had reached to a point seventy-five yards from the crest of the hill, where intense rifle and machine gun fire was met. A second platoon was dispatched as reinforcement and dug-in on that portion of the hill-side that had been taken.

On the west Company G had encountered determined enemy in the wooded ravine down which it was advancing. The draws branching from the ravine line were heavily wooded, and the steep banks were almost perpendicular making flanking maneuver impossible and limiting attacking groups to a few men in assault. The company, however, moved forward against strong enemy resistance to within 250 yards of Lumboy Bridge.

Co A, on 25 February, successfully employed light mortars and white phosphorous grenades to secure the second of the Saru Hills.

During Company A's action, Company C advanced along a ridge-line parallel to Highway 5 with little opposition until the objective, a "Sugar-loaf" shaped hill overlooking Lumboy to the north and Highway 5 to the south. For three days Company C employed demolitions and flame throwers in the draws of the hill-mass, thus completing the 1st Battalion's mission in the Lumboy action.

In the 2d Battalion sector Company F moved north along a rugged hill-line to a position west of Highway 5 but 1000 yards north of Lumboy. Along the route many small groups of enemy were met and annihilated; however, at the area 1000 yards north of Lumboy a well-defended enemy strong-point was encountered. Enemy Artillery pieces at an "S" curve 2500 yards north of Lumboy fired heavy concentrations in the western sector.

Fighting was intense in the 2d Battalion zone as the enemy fought to the last man to defend his positions. By 1 March Company F fought its way to a hill-mass immediately west of the "S" curve and obtained direct observation on four enemy artillery pieces. Counter-battery was brought to bear, and the guns were destroyed. Company C cleared the draws west of Lumboy, seized the bridge, and there emplaced a road block. Highway 5 was now clear from San Jose to Lumboy.

Because of the densely wooded terrain in the 2d Battalion sector west of Highway 5, in contrast to the grassy Saru hills, the Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to continue the attack north to Puncan Mountain in order to meet the 35th Infantry converging on Digdig from the east, and the 161st Infantry on the barrio of Puncan from the west.

Company A moved from the Saru Hills to attack the hill-mass forming a route of approach to Puncan Mountain. This was accomplished with a minimum of effort, and Company B joined Company A. The next day Company A began to clear the draws on the east while Company B followed a similar plan on the west. This operation by small patrols proved lucrative, and our forces suffered light losses.

While Company B continued clearing the draws, Company A commenced an attack on Puncan Mountain. As in the Saru Hills, little resistance was encountered until the crest was approached. Here the Japanese held commanding ground, and it was only by close fire support that our troops were able to approach the enemy emplacements and destroy the defenders.

As Puncan Mountain was seized, friendly troops from the other regiments were observed moving onto their objectives.

Chapter Eight

DIGDIG TO PUTLAN

The 3d Battalion, on 5 March, relieved the 3d Battalion of the 35th Infantry and initiated aggressive reconnaissance to the north along the sector east of Highway 5, this being the Regimental Zone of Action. A block was established astride the highway, and enemy stragglers attempting to break through during the night were unsuccessful.

3000 yards north of Digdig on Highway 5 another block was established, and patrols sent from this point to the north reported only negative or scattered contacts. On 7 March Company I dispatched a strong combat patrol to the north, and the remainder of the company closed on this group 5000 yards north of Digdig.

Moving northward Company I then contacted a small enemy force in the barrio of Anabat, and after routing the enemy, a road-and-river-block was then established in the village. Company L, protecting the east flank of Company I, encountered no opposition. The high ground overlooking Putlan was reached by Company I on 10 March, and the resistance which was met evacuated under pressure. The 35th Infantry, driving toward Putlan from the east, was contacted in Putlan proper.

Company L relieved the 1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry and started the task of mopping-up the draws on the east side of the highway. For convenience these draws were numbered by Regimental Headquarters, number 1 being immediately north of Putlan, and consecutive numbers were given to the draws to the north.

On 11 March Company K passed through Company L to continue the advance to the north, leaving Company L the mission of cleaning out the resistance in Draws 1 and 2. A hill 1000 yards north of Putlan was designated as Company K's objective, and resistance was met on route thereto. After leaving a force to contain and eliminate this enemy, Company K advanced to the immediate south of its objective, and on 11 March heavy resistance was encountered on the objective.

On 13 March Company L completed the reduction of the stubborn enemy pockets in Draws 1 and 2.

The enemy continued to defend Draw 4 and the hill-mass in front of Company K. A hill to the north of the objective and a connecting ridge were seized, and succeeding days witnessed intense and bitter fighting as the enemy savagely clung to his well-intrenched (sic) positions.

On 18 March a tank-led attack was launched, and the objective was successfully cleared. This was accomp1ished in spite of extremely difficult terrain, especially for the employment of armor.

Chapter Nine

MYOKO MOUNTAIN

Some three thousand yards south of Ba1ete Pass, the gateway to the Cagayan Valley, the enemy constructed his Main Line of Resistance. These defenses formed a general east-west series of fortifications extending from a right f1ank west of Highway 5 to some distance beyond the Old Spanish Trail which parallels Highway 5 approximately 12,000 yards to the east.

To man this Main Line of Resistance the enemy had formed a provisional force composed of elements of his main Infantry reinforced by various service units collected from all sectors of Luzon. Principal enemy units represented were the 10th, 11th, and 63d Infantry Regiments; the 10th Engineer Regiment; the 10th Transportation Regiment, the 8th Railroad Regiment; and artillery from the 10th Division reinforced by independent artillery and heavy mortar units.

The terrain south of Balete Pass was especia1ly suited for defense. Perpendicular to Highway 5 the enemy's defenses were constructed along a series of ridges and principal hill-masses to which there were few natural routes of approach. The central anchor of the Main Line of Resistance was formed on Myoko Mountain, the dominating hill-mass of the entire area south of Balete Pass and north of Putlan. This mountain, southeast of Balete Pass, rises to a peak of over 4000 feet above sea level and is the connecting link between the great ridge and hill-masses of Kabuto, Minami, and Kongo, the latter being the terrain formed by Lone Tree and Wolfhound Ridges.

The 27th Infantry was assigned a zone of action east of Highway 5 with the mission of pushing north and building a road east of the highway.

The ultimate objective of the current operation was Balete Pass, and from air and ground reconnaissance the Regimental Commander determined that the key to Balete Pass was towering Myoko Mountain. From Myoko Mountain, Lone Tree and Wo1fhound Ridges formed a natural and feasible route of approach for an envelopment of the Pass from the southeast, and from the beginning of the advance from Putlan the concentrated efforts of the regiment were bent toward the seizure of Myoko.

With the 2d Battalion in the lead, the regiment commenced the advance to the north. Company G was assigned the left sector adjacent to the highway, and Companies E and F were directed toward Myoko.

The terrain was characterized by steep slopes covered by dense rain forest which offered many problems and hardships in both maneuver and supply. The enemy was supported by intense mortar and automatic weapon fire, and his riflemen were well dug-in on commanding ground. The importance of Myoko Mountain to the enemy was evidenced at this early date by tenacious counter attacks against our troops as they slowly made their way, sometimes on hands and knees, up the precipitous slopes.

After initial successes progress became increasingly difficult, and it was concluded that the enemy strength was too large for a one-battalion operation. The 1st Battalion was ordered to relieve the left (west) sector of the 2d Batta1ion in order that the latter might concentrate its efforts in the Myoko area.

The most favorable approach to Myoko was a long ridge extending southeast to Highway 5, and here it was decided to construct a supply road. The ridge itself was a razor-back formation with steep slopes averaging eighty degrees. The absence of 1ateral fingers or more gentle slopes prevented any appreciable flanking movements, and the only alternative was a direct drive along the ridge line.

On the west the 1st Battalion was able to score some advances, but only by rugged and tedious fighting and maneuver. Upon approaching the Kapintalan Ridge enemy resistance stiffened, and likewise on Myoko the enemy was showing signs of more strength.

Upon Division order the 36th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion in its sector on 30 March. The 3d Battalion relieved the 2dBattalion, and the 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of protecting the supply route in rear of the 3d Battalion.

Confronting the 3d Battalion were enemy dug in along the sharp ridge line, and in the enemy fortifications were numerous log pillboxes containing automatic weapons that wore excellently sited to provide interlocking bands of fire on all routes of approach. To avoid a head-on move against this enemy Companies I and K made flanking movements down, around, and up the steep sides of this ridge-line of Myoko Mountain. Company L was assigned the mission of mopping up the remaining enemy astride the ridge and behind Companies I and K.

At this time the enemy began determined efforts to cut the regiment's supply road, and Company G was assigned the mission of guarding the route against those enemy attempts. Enemy groups would move in under cover of darkness and setup a machine gun astride the ridge along which the road was constructed. The steep slopes of the ridge line caused a considerable time element when combat patrols worked their way around the flanks of those groups, thus traffic was delayed considerably.

To the west of the crest of Myoko Mountain the enemy had constructed strong fortifications atop the "Scar," a spur of the principal hill-mass. Company C was assigned the reduction of this pocket of resistance which was a threat to the left flank of the regiment, and from here enemy harassing parties were sent to place blocks on the supply road to Myoko. Artillery and mortars were employed in support of ground troops against this enemy; however, advances were measured in yards. Enemy troops in this area habitually hold their fire until our troops had reached within a few yards.

The antitank Company was assigned the responsibi1ity of guarding the regiment's right flank and patrols were sent daily along the stream dividing Myoko and the ridge to the east.

A platoon of medium tanks from the 775th Tank Battalion was attached to the regiment and the platoon was immediately placed in position with Company L for support in the latter's operations against the enemy astride the ridge in rear of Companies I and K. The terrain was not "tank country." Rather than the usual flat or gently rolling ground usually associated with armor, Myoko Mountain offered only the sharp, narrow ridge line to the northeast. Saddles and knolls were impassable, and bulldozers had to cut paths, often pushing the tanks into position.

The tank operation was successful, however, in spite of those difficulties, and ground troops followed in close support. When terrain was reached over which the tanks could not move, Infantrymen moved ahead to secure the next favorable ground, and the bulldozers followed to improve the ground for further employment of the tanks. Often the path of the tanks was so narrow that a small portion of each track extended over the edge of the ridge.

Following the operations along the Myoko Ridge-line the tanks moved to support Company C on the "Scar." Here again the same problems were met and were overcome by dogged work, skillful employment of tanks, and unceasing and determined efforts on the part of Infantrymen.

During the operations on Myoko air support was employed in close-in support of ground troops as well as on the ridge east of the supply road. On this ridge the enemy had emplaced numerous artillery pieces which constantly fired laterally on our troops. When the close proximity of troops prevented close-in support, air strikes were directed on probable concentrations of reserves and along the general route over which the regiment planned future operations. This policy was followed continuously to Balete Pass. Well in advance of actual ground operations future objectives were heavily bombed by aircraft.

On 30 April the 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion, and the supply route security was assumed by the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion moved to reserve. Following an air strike 12 April the battalion with Company B in advance attacked under cover of an artillery preparation.

Here again the enemy had constructed strong fortifications combining log covered emplacements and intense automatic weapon fire, These positions wore so sited that they covered any and all natural or feasible routes of approach to the enemy's strong points.

The medium tanks again moved in to closely support the Infantry attack. By close coordination between tank and ground commanders were contacted, fired on, and destroyed. The psychological effect on the enemy was very strong, and the absence of antitank guns proved that he had not remotely expected or considered that tanks could be employed in this sector. His assumption was not at all difficult to understand in view of the extremely high elevation of the terrain, and in employing the tanks seemingly insurmountable obstacles were overcome in defeating the terrain as well as the enemy.

The highest point of the main Myoko hill-mass, known as the Pimple, had been seized. This was separated from the next knoll, the "Wart," by a shallow saddle. Following the same tactics and noting the same obstacles of terrain and enemy the 1st Battalion continued operations to the north. Here again the support of the medium tanks was invaluable.

The seizure of the "Pimple" required long days of tortuous and close-in fighting, and this same process was repeated in the capture and occupation of the "Wart." The detailed operations are not listed solely because it would be a repetition of the foregoing description of the reduction of enemy on the "Pimple."

Throughout the Myoko operations artillery fire increased in preponderance, and units along the entire length of the road received heavy concentrations of enemy fire.

North of the "Wart" lay a steep ravine, and across the ravine two hills rose to heights approximately the same as the "Pimple." The southern hill was assigned as an objective for the 1st Batta1ion.

On 15 April Company A succeeded in crossing the ravine; however, intense enemy fire prohibited digging in, so the company returned. Plans were made for a tank-led attack by Company C with Companies A and B following.

Heavy resistance was met, and while Company B applied pressure to the front Company C moved around to the west. The tanks could not traverse the steep slopes of the ravine, thus while the bulldozer worked on cutting a road they supported the attacking echelons with overhead fire.

The Regimental Commander decided to side-slip the 2d Battalion around the west of the 1st Battalion in order to attack the hill to the north of the 1st Battalion's objective. Company A replaced Company G as security for the Forward Regimental Command Post and that part of the supply road south of Myoko Mountain.

While Companies B and C continued to attack the southern hill Company G moved north 400 yards and turned east. Upon turning east heavy resistance was met from the objective hill. On 19 April Company G received a fierce counter attack from the enemy. This enemy effort was repulsed, and in order to follow up the advantage of the enemy's loss of strength, a platoon of Company F immediately passed through Company G.

Company F pushed the attack to the east, and after a short distance was confronted by a perpendicular stone cliff covered on both flanks by strongly intrenched (sic) enemy. Against this intense resistance Company F moved forward to within 75 yards of the hill top. At this point the slopes of the hill were practically perpendicular, and the company withdrew a short distance to an area more suitable for digging in.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion succeeded in providing a suitable route for the medium tanks. A new-model light tank equipped with a flame thrower had been attached to the regiment; however, the terrain had prevented the employment of this weapon. Using the supporting fire power of the medium tanks the battalion slowly and tediously made its way up the slopes of the battalion objective against a strong and reinforced enemy and on 21 April the hill was secured.

The battalion immediately began operations to clear out enemy resistance between its objective and the objective hill of the 2d Battalion.

Each yard of progress along Myoko Mountain had been bitterly and dogged1y contested by a determined enemy. Consequently, movement was extremely slow with all terrain advantages definitely on the side of the enemy.

Fo11owing a bold plan of the Regimental Commander a platoon of Company G on 22 April made a wide swooping move to the west of Myoko Mountain through precipitous ravine to the mid-point of Grassy Saddle. This move was not detected by the enemy, and the remainder of Company G was immediately closed on the leading platoon. The company continued the move to the north and succeeded in reaching the extreme top of Lone Tree Ridge, marking a 2500 yard penetration of the enemy' s line of defense. During the movement to Lone Tree Ridge Company G sometimes heard enemy movement within 100 yards of its positions; however, the entire move skillfully escaped enemy detection.

Exploitation of this penetration is covered in Chapter Ten, "Lone Tree Ridge."

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion completed, mopping up the remaining enemy between the battalion objective and the hill confronting Company F, and relief was commenced by the 3d Battalion.

In concurrence with the Regimenta1 Commander's decision to immediately follow Company G's penetration with the remainder of the 2d Battalion, Company L relieved. Company F, emplaced a block in Company F's former positions, and the remainder of the battalion continued the northerly advance along Myoko Mountain toward Elbow Hill, the connecting terrain between Myoko and Lone Tree.

Again the enemy fortifications were well-selected, well-prepared, and well-defended. The terrain was especially unsuited for tank operations, and it was only by ceaseless efforts of the bulldozer operators, often working in face of intense enemy fire, that a tank trail was constructed.

After considerable difficulty the light tank mounted with a flame thrower was placed in operating position and its performance was especially successful. In addition to the enemy actually charred by the flame itself, many enemy were killed by rifle fire when they exposed themselves in abandoning their positions because of the terrifying effect of the flame tank.

Company K slowly worked along the ridge line making use of all Infantry principles of fire and movement and succeeded in reaching a small knoll within 40 yards of the top of the principal hill-mass.

In order to further strengthen the units on Lone Tree Ridge the 3d Battalion was ordered to move to reinforce the 2d Battalion. To continue operations north along Myoko the 3d Battalion of the 35th Infantry was attached to the 27th Infantry.

On 29 April the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, passed through the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and by mid-day gained the top of the hill on whose forward slopes Company K of the 27th Infantry had dug-in the night of' 26 April. The 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, proceeded to Lone Tree Ridge, leaving Company K along the lengthy supply route as security.

Against intense enemy resistance the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, slowly progressed toward the Elbow. The ridge was broken by a series of small knolls and saddles which caused continued difficulty in the employment of the tanks. As had been the case continually during the Myoko Mountain operations the enemy reinforced his positions in a determined effort to halt the advance of our troops.

On 5 May l945 the Myoko installations of the regiment were relieved by the 148th Infantry in order that the full concentration of the 27th Infantry could be directed toward operations to join the 35th Infantry on Lone Tree Ridge and to subsequently seize Balete Pass.

The entire advance along Myoko Mountain was bitterly contested by a strong and continuously reinforced enemy, and it was only by the skillful and experienced employment of Infantry principles closely coordinated with supporting weapons that the Japanese forces, favored the entire struggle with advantages of terrain and weather, were dislodged from the strong fortifications they had constructed. In the operation the enemy lost a total of over twelve hundred killed, much materiel captured and destroyed, and when Myoko Mountain was lost to him, gone was his main center anchor of the Main Line of Resistance established for the defense of Balete Pass.

Chapter Ten

LONE TREE RIDGE

Company G on 22 April succeeded in locating a gap in the enemy Main Line of Resistance which lay athwart Myoko Mountain. To exploit this advantage the Regimental Commander ordered an immediate follow-up by the entire 2nd Battalion.

Accordingly, the battalion assembled at the base of Lone Tree Hill on 24 April, and after an intense artillery, mortar, and cannon preparation of 25 April, Company G led the advance. It was evident that the entire move of over three thousand yards by the 2d Battalion was undetected and unexpected by the enemy because the attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy who were killed in their holes leaving 1-75mm, 1-37mm, and 2-47mm guns unmanned. The remainder of the 2d Battalion immediately closed on Company G and continued in the direction of Balete Pass. 1200 yards of Wolfhound Ridge which leads to the Pass were cleared by the third day.

Companies I and L were attached to the 2d Battalion as was company B of the 35th Infantry. The route of supply via Myoko Mountain was long and tedious and was vulnerable to enemy harassing action. The time required for a round trip by carrying parties was thirteen hours, and it was felt by the Regimental Commander that the most important immediate problem was the opening of a shorter supply route along Lone Tree Ridge. Thus the advance along Wolfhound Ridge was temporarily halted in favor of concentration of effort toward a drive southwest along Lone Tree Ridge to form a juncture with the 35th Infantry.

In order to personally direct the all-important operations on Lone Tree and Wolfhound Ridges the Regimental Commander, Colonel Lindeman, and the Regimental Operations Officer moved to Lone Tree Ridge, remaining with the forward elements until the actual fall of Balete Pass.

Upon a decision to employ two battalions, the 2d along Lone Tree, and the 3d along Wolfhound to Balete, the 3d Battalion Commander with an advance Command Post moved to Wolfhound Ridge. Companies I and L remained on Wolfhound Ridge for further operations toward Balete Pass and Company K was assigned the mission of securing the supply trail from Myoko Mountain.

While the advance along Wolfhound Ridge had met only surprised and disorganized resistance, the attack along Lone Tree Ridge was contested by strong resistance estimated at two platoons supported by automatic weapons. Utilizing direct support from medium tank and M-7 direct fire from positions on Myoko Mountain, and after two attempts, the hill was taken with the enemy force destroyed and three machine guns captured.

As the attack was directed toward a junction with the 35th Infantry, for simpler control purposes, it was decided to launch an attack by company B of that regiment. Passing through Company G, Company B of the 35th Infantry encountered a strongly held hill, and after two attacks the first high ground was secured. This ground proved to be only one small part of an ingeniously organized defensive position, and only the reverse slope was occupied by Company B as the forward slope and top of the hill were under enemy small arms and machine gun fire.

The advance to secure the next high ground continued the following day. After a fifty yard advance Company B came under intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire, and was forced to withdraw. The following day Company G passed through Company B, but after two attempts to seize the hill, was forced to withdraw.

The picture was beginning to clear, and it was felt that the backbone of the Lone Tree defense had been reached. The fanatical, determined resistance indicated that the ground under contest was of the greatest importance to the enemy. The direction of the defensive organization and its effectiveness indicated not only a strong force but capable leadership.

Following an intensive artillery preparation Company E passed through Company G and advanced seventy-five yards. After intensive close fighting which lasted until 1800 the secured ground was consolidated. Contact was not broken, and the fighting continued throughout the night between Company E and Japanese elements on the reverse slope and on two adjacent knolls. Several automatic weapons, an 81 or 90mm mortar, and many "knee" mortars were encountered.

The Japanese strongpoint 600 yards south of Lone Tree Hill required seven days and the employment of three companies on successive days. This was another reverse slope situation which covered three high points fifty to seventy-five yards apart in the shape of an equilateral triangle. Each piece of ground was ingeniously organized with deep connecting tunnels cut into the reverse slopes with vertical shafts at the ends for firing positions. White phosphorous grenades thrown into some of the caves emitted smoke through as many as five holes in the hillside.

Artillery and mortar fire caused little damage to these caves, and it was not until the 81mm mortars on Lone Tree Hill were brought into action that those caves were hit. The flaw in the enemy defense of this area proved to be unpreparedness for an attack from the south and east. The surprise move of one platoon of Company E to this point together with the employment of mortars and flame throwers was the beginning of the final reduction of the strong point. During the first day of this move, the platoon picked off fifteen Japanese from the rear and put out of action two forty-seven millimeter guns.

The highest point of Lone Tree Hill was evidently an observation point and artillery position with no prepared defensive positions, but with living quarters in tunnels on the west and north slopes. Many of these tunnels were thirty to fifty feet long with a twenty-foot turn at the end. Neither the tunnels nor the artillery pieces had been damaged by our bombardment. All Japanese killed on this hill were killed while in their caves or attempting to escape to the northwest. From one of these caves an enemy lieutenant-colonel succeeded in wounding two of our men before a white phosphorous grenade completed his mission with the Japanese Army.

Mopping-up of the area accounted for an additional hundred of the enemy in caves and in the open; thus the Lone Tree Ridge engagement cost the Japanese over four hundred killed, the larger part of a battalion. Many caves had been sealed, and it is believed that equipment and dead Japanese still remain uncounted.

That Lone Tree Ridge was considered of prime importance to the Japanese is without question. Lone Tree Hill was the last observation point from which artillery fire could be directed on the installations in the Digdig Valley, and this same hill formed a vital connecting link from which subsequent operations moved along Wolfhound Ridge to seize Balete Pass.

This importance was tangibly shown by captured orders in which Colonel Hayashi, the Japanese Commander of the Balete Pass Defensive Sector, cited to his subordinate commanders the devastating effect of the deep penetration of his defenses and frantically called on his command to stem at all costs the onrush of men and materiel which poured into this gap and from him wrested his most important terrain in North Luzon - Balete Pass.

Chapter Eleven

BALETE PASS

From Lone Tree Hill, Wolfhound Ridge forms a northwest route of approach to Balete Pass, the prime objective of the entire Digdig Valley operation. The Pass itself is a narrow, seventy-five-yard wide opening in the great east - west ridge line that forms the water shed of the Digdig and Santa Fe Rivers, the former flowing south to the Central Plains, and the latter flowing north toward the rich, fertile Cagayan Valley.

Wolfhound Ridge itself is a long southeast - northwest ridge sloping from Lone Tree Hill toward Balete Pass. Along the ridge line are numerous small knolls, some wooded, and others covered with kunai grass.

On each of those knolls the enemy emplaced strong-points, all well dug-in and mutually supporting. Strengths varied from a reinforced platoon to a company on each. The enemy's resistance was characterized by his dogged defense of his prepared positions and his willingness to die in unsuccessful infiltration attacks against our heavy mortars. The loss of Wolfhound Ridge which overlooked Balete Pass would completely sever his supply lines to his troops still in positions south of the Pass on the lower portions of Lone Tree Ridge, The crest of Kapintalan Ridge, and the draws and valleys between Wolfhound and Lone Tree and Kapintalan Ridges. Knowing this, the enemy fiercely resisted every attack designed to dislodge him from his key position.

On 4 May Companies I and L commenced relief of Companies E and F which had progressed some 3000 yards along Wolfhound Ridge from Lone Tree Hill. Upon completion of this relief company L, on 5 May, advanced forward to seize the first knoll to the west. Heavy resistance was encountered, but Company L dug in on the crest of the hill with the enemy still holding the reverse slope. On 7 May Company I followed an artillery preparation to attack and seize a wooded knoll 500 yards west of Company L.

Turning southwest on a finger leading from Wolfhound Ridge, Company I secured another knoll south of the Pass and overlooking Highway 5. Patrols were sent out along the ridge-line, and one succeeded in reaching within 300 yards.

On 9 May Pfc. John Patrick O'Leary, Platoon Scout, Company I, was the first to reach the ruins of the Rest House in the center of Balete Pass. Thus the operation from San Jose to Balete Pass, a distance of thirty-three miles of bitter, yard-by-yard fighting was ended, and the front door to the Cagayan Valley was at last in American hands.

Company A then followed the Digdig River west of Highway 5 and contacted Company I. This new supply route eliminated the long and tedious trail, via Myoko, and Company K returned to the 3d Battalion.

Ed. note: link to photos of Balete Pass

Chapter Twelve

SANTA FE

A part of the 25th Division's drive on Sante Fe, the 27th Infantry was directed to attack to the northeast and seize the forward slopes of Shio Yama which dominated Santa Fe from the east. Here the regiment was to block hostile approaches from the Sawmill - Tayug - Tactac area on the southeast and Shio Yama on the northeast. (See FO 12, Hq 27th Inf, Annex C.)

The 1st Battalion moved to join Company A on Wolfhound Ridge overlooking Balete Pass, having been assigned the western sector of the Regimental Zone of Action. The 3rd Battalion was assigned the eastern sector with the 2d Battalion protecting the regiment's southeast flank.

Patrols to the north determined that the enemy held the Bolong Plateau (between Wolfhound Ridge and Santa Fe) and on 11 May Company C led the 1st Battalion attack, and a heavy machine gun platoon went into action on Wolfhound Ridge to interdict Highway 5. This platoon was successful in anihilating (sic) a number of small enemy groups.

Company C secured the first ridge to the north. During the ensuing ten days all elements of the 1st Battalion gradually wrested from the enemy the hills southwest of Shio Yama. Against an enemy who was firmly entrenched on high ground and supported by automatic weapon and mortar fire, each hill was bitterly contested. Artillery fire was employed as close as 100 yards in advance of the front line troops, and the enemy suffered heavily in his suicidal defense of his positions.

Confronting the 3d Battalion was not only a fanatic enemy, but the terrain consisted of a series of cross-compartment ridges impossible for a road route. Company I then swung to the west through the 1st Battalion sector, and from here turned east. Intrenched (sic) enemy were contacted on the east side of the plateau. After an artillery and M-7 preparation, an attack seized this terrain.

Companies K and L relieved the 1st Battalion in order that the latter could continue north toward Sante Fe. A tank-led attack succeeded in clearing the last enemy from the regiment's portion of Bolong Plateau.

Companies K and L combined to form a block astride the Sawmill Road and River. This denied the use of the Sawmill area to the Japanese and cut off the enemy supply and evacuation route to the Tayug - Tactac area. This block, heavily reinforced with machine guns, accounted for almost a half-hundred enemy moving along the trail.

The westward slopes of the Shio Yama hill-mass comprise a series of east-west fingers running onto the north-south ridge line. The 1st Battalion employed covering fires to support enveloping movements to the grassy ridge lines. From here strong combat patrols sought enemy dispositions. These groups of enemy were destroyed by close support of mortars followed by fire and movement operations.

Throughout the Shio area were many fluid enemy groups, and it was only by aggressive and comprehensive combat patrolling that Shio Yama was finally cleared.

Until 12 June all units conducted extensive combat patrolling in the Regimental Sector moping-up scattered groups of enemy. Some groups were seeking to escape while others, under the impression that Bolong Plateau was still in Japanese hands, attempted to "reinforce" the enemy elements supposedly there.

In the Sante Fe action the Japanese suffered losses of 737 killed, many of whom were members of enemy groups who encountered our block and ambushes. In addition, the loss of Sante Fe threatened the rear of the enemy forces on the Villa Verde Trail, causing the Japanese in this area to withdraw to the Cagayan Valley

Chapter Thirteen

SPANISH TRAIL - CAUCO

Following the seizure of the Santa Fe and Sawmill areas, the regiment was directed to continue the mission of blocking all hostile approaches to Santa Fe from the east. Accordingly, the 1st and 3d Battalions further organized the Shio Yama hill-and-ridge-mass to accomplish this, and long range patrols were dispatched to the east. These patrols detected enemy concentrations of troops such that accurate mortar, M-7, and artillery fire could be placed thereon.

Instructions were received that the regiment would move to a new training area south of Tarlac, and the 3d Battalion commenced the move south. In the midst of the move, however, orders were changed, and the entire regiment was directed to move to the Spanish Trail - Cauco area, the eastern route to Aritao.

From Carranglan the Spanish Trail follows the Barak River north through Susuga Pass, thence farther north along the Marang River valley to Aritao. The trail was originally constructed by the Spaniards, and along the route were the ruins of stone blockhouses and fortifications. An alternate branch of the trail led to the northeast from the intersection of the Barak and Cauco Rivers some eight miles north of Carranglan, passed through the Cauco Pass, thence northwest to form a further northerly junction with the Spanish Trail.

The terrain is similar to that flanking Highway 5, with high mountains on either side of the river valleys. Between the mountain ranges is an open valley which floods during the rainy season, much like the rice-field areas of the Central Plains,

Prior to the move of the regiment into this area, the 35th Infantry had two months before attempted a drive to the north as a wide envelopment of Balete Pass. The enemy at that time, however, had held the area with a large force, and the entire efforts of the division were directed toward the Highway 5 approach to Balete Pass. The Balete Pass operation had caused the enemy to withdraw much of his strength from the Spanish Trail - Cauco area in order to reinforce his Myoko Mountain defenses south of Balete Pass.

The 27th Infantry was assigned the mission of cleaning out the Spanish and Cauco Trails as far north as Susuga Pass and Cauco Pass. Meanwhile the 35th Infantry was advancing from the northern end of the Spanish Trail south from Aritao with the Marang River fork three thousand yards north of Susuga Pass as an objective. From Susuga Pass and the Marang River fork the two regiments were to contact one another by patrol.

The 3d Battalion was assigned the initial operations in the Spanish Trail area, and the 1st Battalion moved to Digdig awaiting future employment east of the 3d Battalion in the Cauco area. The 2d Battalion reverted to Division Reserve in the Shio Yama - Sawmill area northeast of Sante Fe with the mission of continuing to block hostile approaches from the east.

On 12 June the 25th Division Reconnaissance Troop held a block at the junction of the Spanish and Cauco Trails, and the 3d Battalion relieved this unit with Company L and Battalion Headquarters. The following day Companies I and K rejoined the battalion, moving by truck by Tarlac.

Patrols 2000 yards along the Cauco and 3000 yards north on the Spanish Trail reported negative, and the following day another patrol reported an abandoned enemy trail block consisting of emplacements and antitank obstacles 5000 yards from the trail junction. Proceeding farther north enemy astride the trail were contacted, and the patrol withdrew.

On 15 June Company L moved out and occupied the high ground west of the Spanish Trail some 3000 yards north of the trail junction. In the vicinity of the abandoned enemy block a new one was formed by Company I. These two moves were accomplished without opposition; however, a patrol from Company l engaged an enemy strong point 1000 yards north of the block.

Company I passed through Company L and attacked this position, gaining 1500 yards. A patrol from the 161st Infantry on the west contacted Company L at its advance positions, thus forming an east-west line of the two regiments.

Cauco Valley patrols reported encountering small groups of enemy, and on 20 June Company C moved from Digdig into this area with the mission of operating initially under 3d Battalion control with aggressive patrols to the north.

A combat patrol moved out on the following day to secure a dominant ridge 3500 yards south of Cauco Pass. This ridge was a portion of the terrain east of the valley, and an advance of 1800 yards was made without contact, the remainder of the company following at a distance of 1000 yards. During the morning of the same day Company B moved from Digdig and occupied the position vacated by Company C.

Susuga Pass was reached by Company K on 22 June, having moved to the west of Company I, and a Company K patrol contacted the 35th Infantry at the Marang River fork on 24 June.

Company C continued on its mission 22 June and discovered enemy on a hill 1100 yards south of the objective. Artillery and mortar fire preceded an attack, and the hill was taken the afternoon of 23 June.

On the 24th the entire 1st Battalion patrolled its sector, Company B having moved from Digdig the morning of 22 June. It was found that the battalion objective was occupied by an enemy force including a 75mm gun, two of which had been firing on both battalions since the entry into the Spanish - Cauco area.

Company C moved the last 1100 yards to its objective on 25 June and successfully seized the hill-mass. The gun emplacements were found; however, it was learned from a prisoner that the guns had been buried east of the Cauco Valley.

Company I continued reduction of the enemy strong point to the front, a position dug-in on the northern slopes on a kunai grass covered hill, and the enemy had established his strong point inside a woodline to the north of the grassy area. Cleaning up of this pocket was a repetition of the usual close-in digging out of desperate enemy suicidally holding out until the end.

Among a group of fifteen enemy killed by Company C was a Japanese field officer, Major Suzuki, and his dispatch case contained a complete plan for a general withdrawal of Japanese forces from the Kita Yama - Minami Yama sector to the east. The route selected by the enemy was along a trail passing north of Susuga Pass east to Maten Pass (2000 yards west of Cauco Pass), thence some ten miles east of the Spanish Trail area.

Medium artillery fire was placed on this route during the proscribed withdrawal night, and patrols were dispatched to seek and destroy as many enemy as possible before they could complete the withdrawal. A Company A patrol encountered a number of enemy 1800 yards south of Maten Pass; however, well-placed artillery fire caused the enemy to withdraw. Both battalions continued mopping-up and combat patrolling as well as contact patrols to the 35th Infantry. The enemy had withdrawn those of his forces that he could eastward toward Biruk, and the Spanish Trail - Cauco area was cleared.

The Balete Pass action had exhausted the principal strength of the enemy, and a number of his troops were caught in the Kaname - Minami mountain area where they had been stopped en route to reinforce the Balete Defenses. The enemy position was untenable, and he had decided to evacuate to the east. His plans designated small delaying forces in the Spanish Trail - Cauco area, and these forces were those contacted by the 27th Infantry advance up the valleys. During the Spanish Trail - Cauco action numerous small groups were contacted on their way eastward, and artillery and mortar fire worked in conjunction with patrol action destroyed many of these groups.

The entire Susuga Pass operation was handicapped by the lack of an adequate all-weather supply route. Extensive, aggressive patrolling to locate resistance such that artillery fire and air strikes could be placed thereon proved to be extremely satisfactory as evidenced by the destruction of many enemy positions by bombardment.

Movement was commenced to a training camp near Tarlac, and on 28 June the last elements of the regiment left the forward areas after relief by elements of the 32d Division. This was the last official day of the Luzon Campaign, and since 10 February - 139 consecutive days - some elements of the 27th Infantry had manned a front-line sector.

-End of Report-